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T h e  l i t e r a . t u r e  of  Development i s  well-seasoned wi th  re ferences  t o  p u b l i c  
adminis t ra t ion  as a b o t t l e n e c k m l .  Delays, i n e f f i c i e n c i e s ,  shortages of proper ly  
prepared p r o j e c t s ,  inadequate o r  i naccura t e  information,  f a i l u r e s  t o  draw 
down funds a l l o c a t e d  f o r  pub l i c  s e c t o r  expenditure - these  a r e  o f t e n  remarked 
upon and blamed f o r  d isappoin t ing  performance. Those involved tend t o  assuiie 
t h a t  t he re  i s  something .wrong t h a t  needs t o  be cor rec ted ,  and the  p o s i t i v e  
approaches of manpower planning,  t r a i n i n g ,  admin i s t r a t ive  reforms and 
t echn ica l  a s s i s t a n c e  a r e  invoked and brought t d ; b e a r .  The b i a s  of advice 
and po l i cy  i s  cons t ruc t ive :  t h e  adminis t ra t ive 'machine  must be made a b l e  
t o  do whatever it  i s  thought d e s i r a b l e  t h a t  i t  should do. Obviously, t h i s  
i s  a  necessary a t t i t u d e , e v e n  though, wi th  t h e  p a r t i a l .  exception of t echn ica l  
a sq i s t ance ,  t h e  process  t y p i c a l l y  takes  a long time. 
There i s ,  however, another ,  neglected,  approach which co11l.d supplement 
these  t r a d i t i o n a l  measures. I f  t h e  executpve capaci ty  - the  c a p a b i l i t y  of 
g e t t i n g  th ings  done - o f t h e  government bureaucrac ies  of pcorer  coun t r i e s  
i s  a severe  c o n s t r a i n t  ondevelopment ,  then t h e r e  would seem t o  b e a n  a  p r i n r i  
case f o r  t r e a t i n g  i t  as a sca rce  resource and sub jec t ing  it t o  the  a t t i t u d e s  
i m p l i c i t  i n  the  techniques - r a t ion ing ,  t e s t i n g  f o r  consis tency of  use ,  unirr 
cos t ing ,  shadow-pricing, and. s o  f o r t h  - employed w f ~ h  o t h e r  scarce  r e s o w c e s ;  
i n  s h o r t ,  a  case f o r  being c a r e f u l  and spa r ing  i n  i t s  use. 
k 
. . .  
I , .  
This seems s o  obvious t h a t  i t  hiis t o  be a s k e d  why. t h i s  approach receiver; 
s o  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n .  I b r e  appear t o  be t h r e e p a r t i c u l a r l y  p o t e n t r e a s o n s ~  
The f i r s t  i s  t echn ica l .  ‘Executive capac i ty  i s  d i f f i . c u l t  t o  measure. To h e  
su re ,  t r a i n e d  manpower. can be counted, but  .bureaucra t ic  performance i s  r e l a t e d  
n o t  j u s t  t o  s tocks  of manpower but a l s o  t o ' o r g a n i s a t i o n a i ,  mo t iva t iona l ,  
s o c i a l  and economic v a r i a b l e s  whFch a r e  d i f f i c r r l t  t o  quant i fy .  I n  s o  fn:e as 
planners  a r e  committed t o  mathematical procedures they a r e  l i a b l e  t o  be d r w n  
away. from g iv ing  due weight t o  uncluantifi'.able f a c t o r s ,  e x e c u r i ~ e  capaci ty  
among them. 
T h e  second reason concerns the  p o l i t i c s  of or:ga~iisations. Nei ther  a 
donor agency n o r a  r e c i p i e n t  o rgan i sa t ion  has a  d i r e c t  i n t e r e s t  i n  cons ider ing  
executive capaci ty  a s  a l i m i t e d  resource  from t h e  r e c i p i e n t ' s  n a t i o n a l  p o i n t  
of view. Thet r  i v e d i a t e  i n t e r e s t s  .%re narrower - the  s ~ l c e e s s  of t h e  pmlject; 
or  programmes they a r e  promoting, evaluated.  l a r g e l y  i n  i s o l a t i o n  from the  
t o t a l  n a t i o n a l  environment. Together,  t h e  donor agency m d  itlie rec iy ier l t  
min i s t ry  o r  department may con t r ive  t o  a t t r a c t  s ca rce  ab le  admin i s t r a to r s  
t o  t h e i r . p r o j e c t s . a n d  prograJmoes without  weighing t h e  i r rd i rec t  c o s t s  of 
from o t h e r  pos t s  o r  t h e  g r e a t e r  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  mj.gh,t de r ive  from 
e n t  elsewhere. T o c o n s i d e r  a  r a t i o n a l  a l l o c a t i o n  of a b l e  men, 
Bee .circumstances, be t o  reduce t h e  chances of p r o j e c t  o r  progr~rmmr 
the re f  ore  t o  undermine t h e  donor, r e c i p i e n t  and p ro j  t c t  a rgan i , s a r io r~s .  
l b e r r  Waterstori, Development P l a n n i ~ ? " ,  
d,  The JohnsNopkins P res s ,  1965, 

The moral i s  that be fo re  p o l i c i e s  a r e  adopted they should be t e s t e d  f o r  
consis tency between t h e  demands they make on adminis t ra t ian .  P a r t  of t h e  
prel iminary eva lua t ion  of a p r o j e c t  o r  programnle should, thus ,  inc lude  an 
assessment of i t s  e f f e c t s  on t h e  adminis t ra t ion  of o t h e r  p r o j e c t s  and 
p rogrames .  l infor tunate ly ,  t h e  immediate i n t e r e s t s  of donor and r e c i p i e n t  
organisa t ions  2.re usua l ly  i n  the success of a p r o j e c t  o r  programme rega rd le s s  
of the  damage i t  may infl,i.cl: on e x i s t i n g  ones. I n  the  present  s t a t e  of t h e  
a r t  i t  would be s u r p r i s i n g ,  though laudable,  if, i n  f e a s i b i l i t y  s t u d i e s ,  
p r o j e c t  eva lua t ions  and even n a t i o n a l  econamic planning;, adequate precaut ions  
were taken t o  avoid admin i s t r a t ive  incons is tency .  Yet,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  wi th  
inc reas ing  ai.d t o  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  and w i t h  each agency t r y i n g  t o  promote i t s  
own p o l i c i e s ,  t h e r e  i s  a dangek of a succession of programmes imposing heavy 
and incompatible loads  on s t a f f .  
i X I .  Res t ra in ing  Demands - f o r  Information 1 I 
Aid donors and p lanners  coxmnonly p l ace  a heavy burden on adminis t ra t ion  
through demands f o r  intormation.  Donors need d a t a  t o  be ab le  t o  convince 
c r i t i c s  a t  home t h a t  t h e i r  a i d  i s  be ing  w e l l  app l i ed , , and  p lanners  a re  
, p ro fes s iona l ly  hamstrung without s t a t i s t i c s .  Regarded i n  i s o l a t i o n ,  and 
without  cons ider ing  t h e  f u l l  imp l i ca t ions ,  a good case can o f t e n  be made out  
f o r  more d e t a i l e d  surveys and more e l a b o r a t e  compilations of information 
before  a p r o j e c t  i s  considered and approved, and then l a t e r  f u r  f requent  
r e p o r t s  on i t s  progress .  F e a s i b i l i t y  surveys and performance r e t u r n s  have 
such obvious payoffs  - i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  p r o j e c t  v i a b i l i t y ,  i n  a l e r t i n g  s t a f f  
t o  cons idera t ions  they  might otherwise have missed, i:n con t r ibu t ing  t o  t h e  
bkrsonal  development of  o f f i c i a h ,  i n  maintaining k f f i c i ency ,  and s o  on - 
t h a t  they can appear  t o  be a u ~ u m a t i c a i l y  b e n e f i c i a l .  
But, of course,  it i s  no to r ious  t h a t  information i s  not  c o s t l e s s .  
In  t h e  o e n t r a l  governments of developing c o u n t r i e s ,  s e n i o r  c i v i l  s e rvan t s  
a r e  o f t e n  sub jec t  t o  many important competing demands on t h e i r  time. When 
a v i s i t i n g  lnission r eques t s  information f o r  a survey of the  economy, the  
i n v i s i b l e  but  r e a l  c o s t  t o  the  country i n  terms of a c t i v i t i e s  n o t  performed 
by t h e  c iv i l .  s e r v a n t s  who have t o  provide the  information may be  very high.  
As Papanek has f o r c e f u l l y  pointed ou t ,  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of b i l a t e r a l  a i d  i s  
diminishing a s  a r e s u l t  of increasi .ng con t ro l s  over  a i d  expend i twe  by 5 :  donors stemming from t h e  need t o  saci i ; fy domestic c r i t i c s  of a id .  Followed 
a l m g  t h e  chain of causa t ion ,  the t r u e  c o s t  ts a r e c i p i e n t  of a h o s t i l e  
ques t ion  about a i d  i n  a donor's legts lat i . i re  may be s u b s t a n t i a l  i f  t h e  r e s u l t  
i s  a demand f o r  s t r i c t e r  and more de ta i l e i i  r e t u r n s .  
S imi l a r ly ,  f o r  t h e  f i e l d  ai lministrat ior is  of developing coun t r i e s ,  t h e  
t r u e  c o s t s  of r eques t s  f o r  inforinati.on may be very high.  It may take a 
planner  only f i v e  minutes t o  d r a f t  a circuJ,.ar asking f u r  crop acreage f i g u r e s ,  
bu t  i t  may take  many thousands of man-hours to provide them. I n  one case i n  
Tanzania bad t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  f i e l d  s t a f f  heen put  onto providing f o r  t h e  
planners  a l l  t h e  infoxmation they r equ i red ,  t hey  would have had sca rce ly  ally 
time f o r  t h e i r  o t h e r ,  more d i r e c t l y  p:roducti-~e ac f t iv i t i e s .  One may wonder, 
too,  a t  the  c o s t s ,  i n  terms of a l texnat i .ve  a c t i v i t i e s  foregone, of such an 
e n t e r p r i s e  as  t h e  World I n d i c a t i v e  Plan  f o r  Agr icul ture  compiled by FA0 on 
t h e  b a s i s  of information requested from the  a l ready o-ver-burdened admi:nis trat ion,  
of the count r ies  of t h e  developing world. The c o s t s  of information can, 
i:ndeed, go beyond t h e  simple d ive r s ion  of s t a f f  from other  a c t i v i t i e s :  tlre 
I 
demora l~sa t fon  of a g r i c u l t u r a l  ex tens ion  s t a f f  so o f t e n  found i n  t h e  poorer  
count r ies  can be a t t r i b u t e d  p a r t l y  t o  t h e  f lood of  i n s t r u c r i o n s  and poorly 
a r t i c u l a t e d  demands f o r  information 6 c h  flow out  success ive ly  from c a p i t a l  
c i t i e s .  
Tlre moral i s  t h a t  donors, p lanners ,  and c i v i l  s e rvan t s  i n  the l e s s  
developed coun t r i e s  should a l l  be s e l f - c r i t i c a l  before  theg ask f o r  f a c t s .  
I c  i s  an old gibe t h a t  p lanners  a r e  prepared t o  c o s t  zaything but  planning 
I i t s e l f ;  but  n e i t h e r  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  no r  those  of a i d  donors deserve immunity from s t r i n g e n t  eva lua t ion .  Before they reques t  information they 
should ask themselves t h e s e  ques t ions :  f i r s t ,  whether t h e  i.nfctmation 
a l ready e x i s t s  ( fo r  instance, has a m t h e r  a i d  agency r ecen t ly  compiled 
inforuintion on t h e  s t a t e  of tlre economy?); second, whether t h e  information 
i s  l i k e l y  t o  be accura t e  enough t o  be usable;  . third,  whether, once c o l l e c t e d ,  
i t  w i l l  i n  f a c t  be used (se l f -decept ion  on t h i s  p o i n t  being p a r t i c u l a r l y  
easy ) ;  and fbu r th ,  whether from t h e  po in t  of view of the  poorer count ry ' s  
n a t i o n a l  development t h e  expected b e n e f i t s  from t h e  information j u s t i f y  t h e  
cos t s  of obta in ing  i t ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  the  c o s t s  i n  t e m s ' o f  t h e  l o s s  of  
the  b e n e f i t s  of a l t e r n a t i v e  s t a f f  a c t i v i t i e s .  
111. Weighing I n d i r e c t  Administrat ive - Costs 
Host p r o j e c t s  have i n d i r e c t  c o s t s  of en admin i s t r a t ive  na ture .  They 
f r equen t ly  make dewnds  on e x i s t i n g  govemnlent ,o r&anisa t ions  which provide 
them wi th  subs id isbd  se rv ices .  Perharps n~ore  important ,  they r e q u i r e  coordina- 
t i o n  wi th  e x i s t i n g  o rgan i sa t ions ,  e n t a i l i n g  correspondence &ld meetings wi th  
o f f i c i a l s  who a r e  o f t e n  a l ready over-burdened. Indeed, t h e r e  i s  a seduct ive  
danger of a c u l t  of meetings which coordina te  without  deciding m d  which, in .  
t h e  meantime ,.consume much time and energy. C o a r d i n a ~ i o n ,  l i k e  plann.ing, 
sounds l i k e  a se l f -ev ident  good; bu t  l i k e  planning i t ' h a s  high admin i s t r a t ive  
cos t s .  I t  may sometimes be cheaper t o  accept  some oS t h e m i s t a k e s  which 
follow from l e s s  cbordinated but  inore t imely a.nd vigorous ac t ion .  
There may a l s o  be high cos t s  a r i s i n g  i:rorn t h e  t r a n s f e r  of s t a f l  t o  new 
p ro jec t s .  Often such c o s t s  a r e  reckoned i n  tezms of d i r e c t  f i n a n c i a l  expend- 
i t u r e  on s a l a r i e s ,  allowances, ark?. so f o r t h ,  b u t  t h e r e  i s  an obvious and 
s t rong  case  forshadow-pr ic ing  t o  i-ake in-count o f  t h c i r  oppor tuni ty  c o s t s  i n  
terms of b e n e f i t s  foregone fx:om the  a l t e r n a t i v e  a i : t i v i t i e s  they might have 
c a r r i e d  out .  This  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  c r u c i a l  i z t  s g r i c u l t u r e ,  w k r e  middl.3-grade 
s t a f f  a r e  o f t e n  d ive r t ed  from t h e  l e a s  v i s i b l e  a c t i v i t i e s  of s g r i c u l t u r a l  
adminis t ra t ion  i n  an e x t e n s i o a  s e r v i c e  ' t o  more v i s i b i e  a c t i v i t i e s ,  usual.ly i n  
site-bound p r o j e c t s  such as se t t l emen t  schemes, s t a t e  f a r m s ,  and i r r i g a t i . o n  
undertaki.ngs. I f  t hese  p r o j e c t s  were cos ted  i n  terms of product ion foregone 
f r o ~ n  n o t  dep loy ing  t h e  s t a f f  elsewhere i n  o t h e r  ways, and iii terms of t h e  
d i s r u p t i o n  caused by t h e i ~ :  tcanslati .on from o t h e r  orgazp.isations, thexi they  
might emerge as much l e s s  favou-rable investments than they a r e  usual ly  
allqwed t o  ;$pear. 
These arguments bear  on Albert  Hirschman's t h e s i s  of the  Hiding Wand, 1 
according t o  which h a b i t u a l  unde r -e s tha t ion  of t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of a  p r o j e c t  
i s  o f f s e t  by h a b i t u a l  underest imation of t h e  c r e a t i v i t y  which can be mustered 
t o  overcome them. For ,  looked a t  c lose ly ,  much of  t h i s  c r e a t i v i t y  may be 
revealed a s  q u i t e  simply d ivers ion  of admin i s t r a t ive  resources from o t h e r  
p a r t s  of the  n a t i o n a l  economy and adminis t ra t ion .  Crea tcvi ty  sounds, but  i s  
n o t ,  c o s i l e s s .  I t s  c o s t s ,  however, tend t o  be concealed o r  ignored because 
both f o r  the  a i d  agency and f o r  the  l o c a l  p r o j e c t  organisa t ion  t h e  u n i t  of 
account i s  the  p r o j e c t  and not  t h e  na t iona l  economy. The fomls taken by 
c r e a t i v i t y  i n  p r a c t i c e  inc lude  n o t  only hidden subs id i e s  and f i s c a l  p r o t e c t i o n  
bu t - a l so  increased  demands on gove,mment departments and poaching of s t a f f  
from o t h e r  o rgan i sa t ions  which may consequently be c r i t i c a l l y  weakened. The 
r e s u l t  may be t h a t  t h e  a i d  agency can show t h a t  t h e  p ro jec t  has been a  
success when considered, a s  i t  tends t o  be ,  i n  i s o l a t i o n ,  and by conventional  
cos t -benef i t  c r i t e r i a .  But t h e  rece iv ing  country a s  n whole may be a  n e t  
l o s e r .  Only r a r e l y  can p r o j e c t s  which emerge a s  "successfu?." a f t e r  overcoming 
major d i f f i c u l t i e s  have been a s  b e n e f i c i a l  a s  they a r e  allowed f:o appear.  
The moral i s  t h a t  t h e  i n d i r e c t  admin i s t r a t ive  c o s t s  of p r o j e c t s  and 
programmes, inc luding  the  l ike l ihood of having t o  meec t h e  c o s t s  of " c r e a t i v i t y , "  
should be taken i n t o  account i n  pre-investment eva lua t ions ,  
I V .  P r e f e r r i n g  Administration-Sparing P o l i c i e s  
There a r e  wide v a r i a t i o n s  between the adminis t ra t ivedemands  of 
d i f f e r e n t  approaches t o  develapment , par:ricular%y i n  a g r i c u l t u r e .  I f ,  f o r  
i n s t ance ,  a  new seed v a r i e t y  i s  self--propagating and does not: r equ l r e  i n t e r m i t t e n t  
renewal o r  a d d i t i o n a l  i n p u t s ,  i t s  dlssernin;:ttnn has low and temporary requi re-  
ments i n  adminis t ra t ion:  once farmers a r e  growing i t  they w i l l  se l l  it t o  
o the r  fazmers and i t  w i l l  spread i t s e l f  without  f u r t h e r  o f f i c i a l  i n t e rven t ion .  2 
Not only a r e  admin i s t r a t ive  demands low, thezv a r e  a l s o  temporary, r e l e a s i n g  
s t a f f  f o r  o t h e r  t a s k s  l a t e r .  I*.. c o n t r a s t ,  approaches which involve the  
in t roduc t ion  of o f f i c i a l l y  administered cuLt iva t ion  systems - t r a c t o r  h i r e  s e r v i c e s ,  
cooperat ive product ion farming, s t a t e  farms, or  con t ro l l ed  i.s:rigation 
systems, f o r  i n s t ance  - tend t o  make heavy demands on admin%strat ion which 
a l s o  tend t o  p e r s i s t .  Often the commitment of government t o  p:roviding s e r v i c e s  
and con t ro l s  i s  v i r t u a l l y  i r r e v e r s i b l e .  Not on1.y a r e  r i s k s  compounded by 
t h i s  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y ,  s ince  abandonment i s  d i f f i c u l t ,  bur dec is ions  aboct 
f u t u r e  deployment of personnel  arc pi:e-ernpted, reducing f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  F U ~ I I L . ~  
policy-making. 
'As e l abora t ed  i n  Albe r t  0. Hirschman, De.veiopment P r o j e c t s  Obse%d_, 
Washington. The Brookings Ins t i . t u t ion ,  1961. liirscimman a l s o  descr ibes  
concealed b e n e f i t s  from p r o j e c t s ,  and t h e s e  should of c o w s e  aLso be taken 
i n t o  account.  
2 Some new seed v a r i e t i e s  r equ i re  renewal. and add i t iona l  i npu t s ,  and s o  becoms 
adminis t ra t ion- in tens ive  and adruinistrati .on-persistent.  See J. Veera 
Raghavan, "Administrat ive Rspec t of In~proved Seed Programme ," The Incliar~, 
Journa l  of Pub l i c  Administrat ion,  Vol. 3 ,  No. 3 ,  July-September 1967 (Spec ia l  
Number on Administrat ion of Food Progduct ion) ,  pp. 511-521. The impl i ca t ion  
i s  t h a t  seed breeders  shouLd s e l e c t  f o r  v a r i e t i e s  which w i l l  be r e l a t i v e l y  
administrat ion-sparing.  
The w e e  i.:ion of rhe re! ati .ve administration-inttjr~siv:?ness and adminis tra-.  
t ion-pers i s tence  u f  d i f f e r e n t  types of p r o j e c t s  a,nd programmes deserves much 
inore ca re fu l  and pe rcep t ive  ana lys i s  than can be attempted he re .  For Lnstar~ce,  
it i s  important to  aslc trhe.ther t h e  yol . ic ies  which a r e  most a t t r a c t h e  t o  donors 
and r e c i p i e n t s  may not  o f t e n  be those which made r e l a t i . ve ly  high and l a s t i n g  
demands on adminis t ra t ion .  Cer ta in ly  t h e  preference  of donors f o r  p r o j e c t s  
which i~xvoPve capi tal .  goods, and t h e  preference  of r e c i p i e n t s  f o r  p r o j e c t s  which 
a r e  boriildedp visih1.e and easy t o  e x h i b i t  and i n s p e c t ,  may e x e r t  a  b i a s  towards 
reqztirement f o r  high-leire2 manpower and p e r s i s t i n g  adminis t ra t ion .  S imi l a r ly ,  
t h e  cap i t a?  crrntent of more dfspersee'i p r o g r m e s  may e x e r t  a  bi.rrs towards hea- 
v i e r  a.nd mrbre l a s t i n g  admin i s t r a t ive  demands. I n  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  f o r  example, 
r u r a l  c r e d i t  o r  the  in t roduc t ion  of t r a c t o r  s e r v i c e s  may have p a r t i c u l a r l y  in- 
ten.sive and persi .s tent  admin i s t r a t ive  requi remmts  which a re  the  e a s i e r  t o  
ignore because of t h e  e f f o r t  of imagination requi red  t o  regard the time and 
energy of ?:he jun.ior s t a f f  who would have t o  ca r ry  them, i?ut P S  a scarce  resource.  
These ques t ions  most remain o p e n ,  and i n v i t e  research:  But s h e t h e r  o r  n o t  
t he re  i s ,  in a i d ,  a h i s s  .a:Nay from p o l i c i e s  trhlch m;k,e lcrw and tcnlporary demands 
towards those wi th  h igh  and Lasting demands, the  main poinr  s tands .  Where exec- -- 
u t ive  capacicy I; sca!.ce p:-aEerrnse ;luruld be ~ I V S L I ~  ~ ~ . l i t ?  : hrngs be ing  equal ,  
-. . .- - . . -. .. . . . ... .. . - .... . -. .- -. -- 
t o  , l l ic : ; .es  .?.. - .  . rlhlctr .. at-.? admini.sciatior~-s-,gril!,:, ... .. . - .. . bath i,. ,fie in,:~-. . . s ~ r y  and i n  the 
. . . -. . - - . . . . . . . . . . . - -. . . -- -- 
v f ? r < L : . c s ? ~ ~ ~  ? v,= , I , . . #  , x.,? ,,,, . >,,,"t,,:s 
Mow that  the  Pearson ('l:?.xmissim :on i n t e r n a t i m ~ a l  :id i.; ?:aki.aig a f r e s h  hard  
look a t  p ~ l i c i a s  m d  perf~.?rm.st~r.~ t o  date. ,  ,.$o~.t%d be t i m e l y  l o r  t hese  four  
com?!.emeni-ary i>o i .n t r  tn ti.? ~1~0il) i r)ed 4 . 7  :*f,l-- 'nor? d e f a i l  than has  been done he re .  
T 
- L  i s  ali t oo  easy 1 f o r  y " < " . - ~  L ~ e s ~ ~ : . ? l s  ar)d teseerch  crh p ~ i h l i c  a&n.i.r~istra-. 
+ . i .,p, in .:I-+ p o o ~ o r  couu$.rier i c s e l f  . , mei!,: *le.iia~xrl.s,.nn sdmin i s r r a t ive  resources 
:ad is th.e%eEore S I ~ ~ E C ~  .;:I i h l i s ~  ver;ii p.+m?me r ~ r i t e t i a .  3ilr i f  t h e  burden of t h e  
argl.me.nil p resented  above i s  s o m d ,  ri?ec a very hili,h p,ri?z.it:y f o r  research  should 
be the  compnra?:ivz admin i s t r a t ive  demsnds of d i . f i e r en t  ilei~elopvient p r o j e c t s  arid 
ptogrammes. 
Tb:is i s  r.artisrtla?:ly *lrgeiat hacause of :he er!t.h~.islastic ai-.ter~.tion being 
paid t o  a :~ . r i cu l tu re  2nd the  r u r a l  sector., wich t h e  W!,r.lcl Sank, o t h e r  mul.ti- 
La te ra l  agenzi.es, and naciortal donor organisar ionc  a3.1 at tempting t o  s t e p  up 
a s s i s t a n c e  t o  r u r a l  development. Fnr r u r s l  de\relopme~xt t s  by i 
towards t h e  use of 
a  government, and 
i s  r e l a t i v e l y  easy 
of  a  semi-axitonorno 
and a s s i s t a n c e  t o  
t o  a s ses s  o r  i n f l u e  
To the  v i s i r i  
whom may have time 
perhaps t o  v i s i t  o  
t u r a l  ex tens ion  workers a  
and remote persons 
imagine, Eut B ch 
hand, 3nd a long--tern. a g r i c u l t u r a l  er, may ha,ve huge 
impl.icati.uns f o r  ?he work and effecr .  
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hey may be involved only in one-shot explanation and persuasion; in the latter, 
hey may be tied for many years to an administration-intensive programme which 
ill not only cast them in the roles of policel'en and debt-collectors but also 
bsorb a high proportion, if not all, of their time, pre-empting the possibility 
of introducing other programmes for as long as the credit programme continues. 
It is to be hoped that the Pearson Corninission and other bodies examining 
aid and development policies will. pay close attention to executive capacity as 
a scarce resource, If it is not adequately weighed in development choices, then 
some aid.policies will continue to be dysfunctional, serving to delay or 
inhibit rather than promote development. It would be wrong, however, to gloss 
over the difficulties of applying the four principlen pdvocated above, for they 
imply that evaluations of aid projects and progranuries should often be less 
favourable than they are, and this may be sensed as a threat to both donor and 
recipient organisations. Moreover, so far as choosing less edministration- 
intensive and less administration-persistent policies nay mean abjuring more 
prestigeful and visible technologically advanced and capital-using policies, 
it will require considerable self-restraint on the part of all concerned. But 
if executive capacity is not treated as a relatively intlastic scarce resource, 
and if at the salile time the volume of official aic1.i~ stepped up, i-I; has to be 
asked whether there is not a danger of sharply diminishing, indeed of negative, 
returns to much of the increased effort. 
